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Retreat Security Planning and Analysis, by Tobin
Planning
The key to successful defense is defense in depth. In each layer of security
it’s imperative to have a full 360 degree protection afforded by
whatever measures, methods or technology you employ. Where it’s simply
not possible to secure your entire perimeter due to terrain or financial limitations,
it’s important to know what’s not completely protected, why it’s
not protected, and what it’s not protected against.
To plan your retreat security, start at the conceptual level. Define what is
to be protected. It might be your primary residence, or it might simply be
a cache containing bug-out supplies. Decide now what the parameters of a successful
defense look like (My food is untouched, 50% of my food is untouched, 25% of
my food is untouched, there are no bullet holes in my roof, etc…). Identify,
in writing, the consequences of failing to achieve the specified parameters.
Doing these things serves two purposes. First, it will help you do develop
the proper scope for your plan. Second, it will help you make some difficult
decisions regarding rules of engagement and alternatives planning.
Threat Assessment
Next, you have to consider what the threat looks like. The threats are specific
to your situation and you have to decide what level of threat you’re
willing or obtain the capacity to defend against. City dwellers might be faced
with threats like small bands of unskilled scavengers, or large groups of semi-skilled
gang members with reasonably good equipment, where the rural resident may be
more likely to encounter small groups of highly skilled woodsmen. Your specific
threat is entirely dependent on where you are, and who is there with you.
What the threat looks like will dictate how you prepare for it, and it’s
definitely not a “one size fits all” exercise. Decide now what
your rules of engagement are, and the level of threat that initiates a flight
response versus a fight response. A threat that is larger, more skilled, or
better equipped than what you prepared for will simply overwhelm your physical
security system. For example, a threat capable of long-distance attack may
never engage your security at all while still being able to attack people or
things at the resource. Concentrating on high-speed avenues of approach will
be appropriate for opportunistic or vehicle mounted threats, but completely
ineffective against the savvy scavenger with a modicum of hunting skill.
Failure to identify the threat correctly might result in too much security,
which could have been invested in food water or power, or too little security,
which will result in someone else gaining the benefit of your preparations.
Security System Design
All security systems have to incorporate three key fundamentals – detection,
delay, and response. You must be able to detect an intruder to be able to respond
to him, and you must be able to respond before he reaches the critical resource.
Detection
Intrusion detection ability comes in many forms, and they have been discussed
exhaustively here and elsewhere. Our primary concern is that the detection
capability is
effective, layered, and sustainable.
It’s imperative that your sensor system have a high probability of detection
with a low false alarm rate (FAR)--where we don’t know why the alarm
went off) and nuisance alarm rate (NAR)--where we know why the alarm went off,
but it wasn’t
something we wanted to detect). In other words, it’s good if the dog
barks, but not if it barks at everything… or nothing at all. It’s
also important to note that people are notoriously poor sensors. Studies conducted
by Sandia National Laboratory indicate that a human has a 2% probability of
detection under normal conditions, and that they are only effective for the
first 20 minutes of a watch. In other words, invest in technology if funding
and opportunity allow you to.
Using cumulative probability equations it’s fairly easy to determine
that several less than perfect sensors arrayed in series can be more effective
that one reasonably good sensor operating alone. One layer of sensors operating
at 90% probability of detection (PD) will cost a fortune and provide a 90%
cumulative probability of detection (PDC). Two layered sensors operating at
70% PD will offer a PDC of 91% at a lower total price:
PDC = 1-(1-PD1)(1-PD2)
= 1-(1-0.7)(1-.07)
= 1- (.09)
= 91%
If possible, place sensors at the perimeter of your property and again at a
defined line within your property. As shown in the example above, two layers
of average quality detection devices are more likely to detect a bad guy than
one layer of good sensors.
Sustainability of detection devices will be a key issue. If your detection
solution is electronic, you have to have means of providing electricity. Fortunately,
many technical solutions are designed to work off of 12 volt DC electric or
AA batteries and have low power requirements. It’s important that you
pay attention to the technical specifications when purchasing equipment. It’s
prudent to acquire replacement units or parts in the event that equipment malfunctions
or is damaged. Electronic sensors and associated support equipment may not
be within your budget. If this is the case, you may elect to go with more cost-effective
biological sensors (dogs, geese and others). They will have a reduced capacity
to warn you when intruders are coming because they can’t observe
your entire perimeter and they, like people, are easily distracted. They require
some level of preparation with respect to food and health care, though this
should be manageable for most budgets. The major drawback to biological sensors
is that while cost effective to purchase and maintain, the opportunity to keep
spares on the storage rack isn’t there. In the event that your biological
sensors are damaged, replacements may be difficult to obtain,
Delay
The objective of an effective delay system is to delay the bad guy from reaching
the objective long enough for the good guys to get dressed, grab their arms,
and engage him in a firefight. In practical terms, the bad guy’s timeline
from engaging the security system (encountering the outermost sensors) to execution
of objective is usually measured in seconds. Your job is to make it enough
seconds that you can respond before it’s over.
Delay can come from mechanical obstacles, or it can come from distance. The
effectiveness of an obstacle is measured in seconds. An 8 foot chain link fence
can be scaled by a human in 10 seconds, and so it’s worth 10 seconds
in timeline calculations. Distance is also accounted for in seconds, but is
dependant on the movement rate of the bad guy. 100 meters is worth 25 seconds
of delay if the bad guy is moving at 4 meters per second. Having a large property
can be an asset if your security system is set up properly, but is not, in
and of itself, an asset. The only barriers or distances that matter are those
that are observed by a sensor system.
Specific delay systems have also been discussed exhaustively here and elsewhere.
It’s important to note that barriers effective against one threat may
be far less effective against another. For example, anti-vehicle ditch works
will provide infinite delay for most vehicles but only a few seconds delay
for a bad guy on foot. On the other hand, a wide open field may delay a bad
guy on foot for minutes, while delaying a vehicle only a few seconds.
Response
The term Response, in the context of physical security, refers to the people;
the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and the equipment used to neutralize
the bad guys. Here’s where you have to ask yourself four questions:
1.) Do I have enough people to secure my critical resource?
2.) Do I have the right training?
3.) Do I have the right equipment?
4.) Do I have alternative plans?
Under optimum conditions, the US military operates under the assumption
that it takes 5.2 people to man each security post 24 hours a day, seven days
a
week. This assumption accounts for eight hour days, leaves of absence, sick
time, and all of the variables that mean people won’t be coming to work.
It’s
likely that you won’t have the manpower to support more than a post or
two under these conditions. The fewer people you have to man each post means
that, in order to maintain proper security, other tasks start to go undone.
If you have only two people per post, for example, that means 12 hour shifts
seven days a week with no rest – leaving no significant time for farming,
gardening, or other tasks. The alternatives are to accomplish other tasks while
abandoning security requirements, or to make arrangements before TSHTF to group
with other like-minded people to provide around the clock security.
Proper training for response forces is imperative. At a minimum, each person
must be familiar with the rules of engagement and the standard operation procedures
required to accomplish the mission. In many cases, this will mean that you
need to define what the mission is and how it’s to be done and put it
in writing. Additionally, you have to define the threshold for response and
the threshold for flight – put that in writing too. Every member of your
response force should be proficient in every weapon system employed. Ideally,
they’re all using the same weapon type, but in the event that they’re
not, they need to be able to use each other’s arms. Every member of the
security force should also be familiar with the terrain out to the maximum
effective range of their weapons. Advanced training with firearms is desirable,
but not always cost effective for groups of any size. If you ask, I’m
certain you’ll be provided with contact information for half a dozen
quality sources for firearms training.
Proper equipment and familiarity with the equipment breeds confidence in your
security forces. Ideally, all of your people will have identical gear. This
will ensure that spare parts are available and that weapon magazines are interchangeable
in a firefight. A proper kit will include firearms, ammunition, protective
gear, restraint devices, and non-lethal weaponry. Suitable arms for your security
forces will be of a weight and configuration that can be handled by all of
your personnel, chambers a round suitable for your purpose, and has a maximum
effective range that can reach the edge of your perimeter (unless you have
a really huge place!). The bottom line answer to the question “what’s
the best rifle?” is – the one your personnel can use effectively
to put rounds on target. Military security forces in garrison typically carry
120 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition when armed with an M16. Depending on your
arms, you may vary the load out, but in a firefight you really want as much
ammunition as you can carry on an “all the time” basis. Protective
gear, whether in the form of body armor or defensive fighting positions (DFPs),
should be able to handle impacts from any ammunition common in the retreat’s
region. For body armor, [NIJ]
level IV protection is desirable, though the type and manufacturer of the armor
is really a matter of taste. DFPs should
be constructed
with overhead cover – more for comfort than protection (unless the neighbors
have mortars) – and double thick sandbag walls. Restraint devices are
for the bad guys that make it through the initial firefight, or for the bad
guys who surrender before a firefight takes place. There are a number of items
that fit this category, though I won’t offer specific discussion about
any of them except to say that heavy duty wire ties work really well in this
capacity. Last, each of your personnel should have access to less-than lethal
control methods. Most likely, your rules of engagement don’t go directly
from harsh words to lethal firefight – neither should your equipment.
If you’ve given the threat sufficient thought, then you’ll recognize
that the security situation will vary widely by the level of threat present
in your area. While you are planning, make sure that you address as many of
the conceivable scenarios as you can. Once you reach that threshold between
viable defense and non-viable defense, put together pre-planned alternatives
to standing and fighting. Make sure your group knows when to bug-out and where
to go. If possible, pre-position bug-out caches to facilitate these plans.
In conclusion, proper retreat security is a huge, but manageable task as
long as you approach it in the correct context. The specifics on how you address
individual elements within the fundamental areas of Detection, Delay, and Response
are less important than addressing them in a balanced and systematic way. In
order to detect the bad guy, you have to have a means of detection, it has
to be effective, and it has to be on. In order to slow the bad guy down, you
have to have obstacles that are pertinent to his preferred mode of travel,
you have to have enough of them so that his total travel time is longer than
it takes your personnel to get within rifle range, and they have to be observed.
To respond effectively and neutralize the bad guy, your response forces have
to numerous enough to counter bad guy forces, they have to know the rules,
and they must have and be familiar with their equipment. Lastly, in a “no-win” situation,
everyone has to know when and how to get out, and where to go.
